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Undoubtedly, many Christians have sensed in a variety of ways the truth
of Brent Strawn’s central thesis that the Old Testament is dying. Few, however, have
managed such a persuasive sustained articulation and defense of this assertion,
specifically within the context of American Christianity. His book offers as evidence
everything from striking anecdotal details that resonate with many of our experiences
in both scholarly settings and faith communities, to statistical data and their nuanced
interpretation, to an overview of demonstrative large-scale shifts within and around
this body of religious tradition as a whole. With readability, wit, intelligence, and
careful consideration—and on the back of a linguistic analogy whose fruitfulness he
harvests to great illustrative effect—the author primes us early on to be receptive to
his hypothesis. He then offers crucial guideposts at vista after vista where we glimpse
ever more broadly the contours and details of his central assertion. This he achieves
by navigating subject matter of immense complexity, which is exponentially more
fraught given the intense and diverse feelings of personal investment—claims of
“ownership,” one might say, or of “rejection”—among Americans both Christian
and not. He performs this feat with a remarkable combination of balance and highresolution detail, without being sidetracked by innumerable issues or concerns, all
of which are legitimate and important. In the hands of another intellectual steward,
they would threaten to hijack the discussion.
As Strawn observes, the problem under scrutiny is not new. In fact, it
strikes to the heart of the notion of canon itself, which asserts by definition that
some material is in and other material is out. This is not solely a Christian issue,
to be sure, but within the Christian context it is worthwhile to highlight Strawn’s
awareness that neither are threats to the life of the Old Testament exclusive to
modernity. Rather, they constitute a pattern that reaches back to the very beginnings
of this particular faith tradition. In the opening pages of his book, Strawn cites the
work of Christopher R. Seitz, which spans the past two decades and considers the
Christian canon from a variety of angles, to point out the inherent pitfalls in the
twofold canonical structure itself (p. 16 n. 43 and passim).1 Later, he returns to
this concern in his closing arguments, where he addresses the notion of Christian
supercessionism: specifically, the “Christocentric, which is to say, Christomonic”
idea that scripture “comes to a covenantal ‘climax’ in the New Testament and in the
New Testament alone” (p. 228).
From this standpoint one is rather more sympathetic to the challenge
of Old Testament “life support” faced by those involved in the emerging Christian
faith in the first centuries of the Common Era, beset as they were by a collateral
(and, for some, irresistible) invitation to juxtapose New-and-Old by way of Newversus-Old. Strawn makes quick work of Marcion with respect to this issue (pp.
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105–21). Yet Marcion is only the most glaring instance of the canonical disputations
of that era. With respect to the Apocrypha, for instance, Jerome wrote, contra his
contemporaries, that the Old Testament canon should accord with his principle
of Hebraica veritas and thus exclude the deuterocanonical works retained in the
Septuagint.2
Moreover, as Strawn observes with Marcion specifically, such challenges
to canonical norms in antiquity exhibit noteworthy resonances in subsequent
periods, all the way up to the present. Martin Luther’s well-documented dismal
opinion of not only Esther, but also James, Jude, and Revelation,3 echoes ancient
perspectives such as that of Eusebius.4 Even today, there is something like irony in
the fact that Jerome is venerated by the Catholic Church, for whom the Apocrypha
are unquestionably canonical, but granted only modest authority in Protestant
Christianity, where Hebraica veritas evidently justifies the noncanonical status of
the very same works.
The remarkable persistence of this crux is due in part, no doubt, to the
relative ease of determining what is out of one’s canon, as opposed to what is in.
Thus, materials that take centuries organically to accrue widespread acceptance and
veneration are later summarily dismissed with the flick of a pen and some heated
rhetoric. But lest we forget the magnitude of the stakes, it is important to realize that
this sorting process, despite its expediency, is much more than just the delineation
of some kind of cool-kids book club. On the contrary, in the case of Christianity,
both individual and collective core identities are in play; and from that vantage it is
plain that the tendency toward canonical reductionism corresponds precisely with
the habitual definition of the Self vis-à-vis the Other, by castigating what we are not
as a means of establishing what we are.
Strawn illustrates this point marvelously by offering the example of selfproclaimed “New Testament churches” (pp. 5, n. 2; 121; 183–83; 239). I concur
wholeheartedly with his suggestion that while such communities do not identify
themselves explicitly as “non-Old Testament churches”—that is, as predicated on
a rather Marcion-like rejection of the Old Testament and its (perceived) God—
nevertheless it seems that institutions claiming the epithet “New Testament church”
may tend just as often to be concerned less with actual validation and promulgation
of the New Testament or its teachings (and even then, often in pidginized form),
and more with focusing on the radiant glory of the New Testament specifically by
way of its contrast with or correction of the horror of the Old. In point of fact, to
my mind, a community who truly wishes to purport devotion to the New Testament
alone, without tacit reference to the Old, might convey this more effectively by
abandoning entirely the term “New Testament”—which implies the standing of its
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polar opposite, the “Old Testament”—in favor of a more self-contained designator
like “the Testament of Jesus” or some such.
For those of us who wish to preserve and revitalize the Old Testament,
therefore, the great challenge is to find ways to assert the relationship, relevance,
range of perspectives, and human complexity of the Old Testament (and the New
as well, although it offers less than a quarter the volume of material), as they relate
to and serve as foundations for our Christian identity and faith. To be sure, this
process of open-ended, positivist (re)expansion—or, more properly, reclamation—
is far more difficult than negative approaches that lead to an ever-diminishing
canon! Yet I suspect that those of us who are involved in any kind of education have
learned to relish precisely this challenge: how to distill without reduction; how to
instill discipline without rigid constraints; how to lead our students to one door
without implying that another should not be opened. Is it possible for someone
studying Sanskrit literature, say—or European history, or any discrete humanistic
discipline—to gain both an effective working knowledge of and a genuine affection
for the subject matter, without actually living in and through the entire relevant span
of time (let alone space!)? Miraculously, the answer is yes, at that happy confluence
between the student’s dedication and trust and our attentiveness and devotion as
educators.
The Christian element adds another layer of complexity to our task,
however. In the course of advancing an entirely different point, Strawn nevertheless
effectively captures this complexity in a single sentence that comes as part of his
opening remarks: “[F]or many contemporary Christians, at least in America, the
Old Testament has ceased to function in healthy ways in their lives as sacred,
authoritative, canonical literature” (pp. 4–5). The latter half of the sentence is a
dense cluster of ambiguities: “function…in their lives”; “in healthy ways”; “sacred”;
“authoritative”; “canonical”; “literature.” To be sure, the vast majority of American
Christians would recognize and be completely comfortable with most or all of these
phrases. They are part of a shared vernacular that resonates across a broad spectrum
of denominations and perspectives. But precisely how would they resonate, from
one context to the next? The question “How does scripture function in your life?”
would undoubtedly elicit a staggering range of responses. Some might describe
the struggle to obey every biblical commandment (real or perceived) to the letter.
Others might identify one or more passages that function as creeds or mottos for
them in daily life. Still others might offer a general sense of comfort, inspiration, or
even aesthetic appreciation with regard to specific portions of scripture as a whole.
Likewise, the suggestion that we should do more to invoke scripture “in healthy
ways” could lead in one scenario to an altar call; in another, to counseling for
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domestic problems, substance abuse, or other matters; in another, to donations or
charity work, and so on. And the other terms in Strawn’s sentence are just as fraught.
Indeed, to isolate a single additional example, in a sense the complex and variegated
question of scriptural “authorit[y]”—or of some scriptures’ authority over against
other scriptures’—sits at the very heart of Strawn’s entire topic!5
With respect to our own authority, therefore, as champions of the Old
Testament we must take care not to allow our passion for and expertise in the material
to delude us into self-satisfaction. Strawn stresses that “one must be fluent in and
attempt to understand the whole linguistic complex” of the Old Testament (pp.
98 and passim). He even asserts that “[d]eficient knowledge of the Old Testament
leads to defects in Christian knowledge” (p. 14). Yet which of us can claim total,
perfect knowledge of the Old Testament, any more than anyone can claim to know
every word in the English language? Thus, a critical part of our advocacy must be to
demonstrate that even as we teach, we remain willing and eager to learn—more to
the point, that there remains a huge range of legitimate hermeneutical perspectives
available to the entire spectrum of American Christianity. In short, we must take
great care not to weaponize Strawn’s linguistic analogy such that any viewpoint we
find unpalatable is relegated to “pidgin” or “creole” status. After all, he is careful to
warn us that “one must guard against implying that there is (or ever was) a pure,
original ‘language’ of ‘biblical belief’ and that all subsequent developments are
somehow deficient or substandard”—let alone the conceit that my subsequent belief
approaches that “true faith” more closely than someone else’s (p. 17). Rather, we
must follow Strawn’s lead, carefully assessing on their own terms the many and
variegated habitual patterns and processes by which the Bible is called upon (or
rejected) as the ostensible source of important religious ideas.
And just as Strawn does by turning directly to Deuteronomy as a model
for teaching scripture that is analogous to second-language acquisition, we might
just as productively turn to the canon for instructive principles on the management
of pluralism. Given the condemnation of Jehu’s slaughter at Jezreel in Hos 1:4-5,
how might the prophet respond when directly confronted with the Deuteronomist’s
praise of the same king, for the same acts, in 2 Kgs 10:30? Or what would Ezekiel,
whose vision for the restored Temple is strictly exclusive (cf. Ezek 44), think of TritoIsaiah’s universalist vision in chapter 56, in which foreigners offer sacrifices and serve
as Temple personnel (cf. Is 56:6–7)? The canon’s routine incorporation of these and
a great many other wildly disparate viewpoints must not be written off merely as
“[what] you would expect of a chaotically cobbled-together anthology of disjointed
documents,” as Richard Dawkins would have it (2006: 268; cited in Strawn, p.
85). On the contrary, notwithstanding the well-established complexity of these
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texts’ developmental history, in philosophical terms the impact of such inclusiveness
should be exactly what I am emphasizing here: pluralism, that is, a fundamental
recognition of the value and importance of plurality within an overarching body
of tradition.
Having said this, we may zoom back out to Strawn’s big-picture perspective
on American Christianity writ large, where we see in his articulation of Old Testament
advocacy the proffering of a potentially scandalous idea: that Christianity is about
more than just Christ. This is Strawn’s rejection of the Christomonic approach to the
faith, and it comes at the expense of even such vaunted Christian minds as Dietrich
Bonhoeffer, who, notwithstanding his continual emphasis on the importance of the
Hebrew canon in the Confessing Lutheran Church, nevertheless offered the opinion
that “it is not Christian to want to take our thoughts and feelings too quickly and
too directly from the New Testament” (Bonhoeffer 1972,: 157; cited in Strawn, pp.
228–29).6
Certainly, such sentiments are troubling for those of us who hold that
the Hebrew canon is essential to Christianity. But I would submit, for my part,
that we could go even further. Frankly, I am no less troubled by a variety of remarks
called upon in Strawn’s work as testimonia, such as this one from Karl Barth. “The
language of faith, the language of public responsibility in which as Christians we are
bound to speak, will inevitably be the language of the Bible. … For certain lights
and indications and heartening warnings can be uttered directly in this language
alone” (1959: 31; cited in Strawn, pp. xxiv–xxv; 74). I concede, of course, that
such a statement is interpreted by Strawn—and likely was originally crafted—as
an observation made and intended for consumption within the confines of the
Christian community. But even in that event, the idea that wholly new formulations
of Christian religiosity are flatly impossible remains troubling. I turn again to
Bonhoeffer, who offers his own linguistic analogy on this point when he describes
looking forward to what has been termed a kind of “religionless” Christianity. “It
will be in a new language, perhaps quite nonreligious language, but liberating and
redeeming like Jesus’s language, so that people will be alarmed and yet overcome
by its power—the language of a new righteousness and truth” (Bonheoffer 2010:
390). Strawn himself seems to concede the point when he notes, “every language…
is subject to change, growth, and development” (p. 16).
Moreover, as Strawn repeatedly reminds us, context is crucial.7 So, the
modern Christian—often haplessly prone to ignorance of context, as Strawn’s
entire book reveals—is exposed to potentially grave misinterpretation of Barth’s
statement.8 Are we to understand that, by its very nature, faith (or anything else)
outside of Christianity falls short of the ideal of “public responsibility;” or, worse,
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that intimate access to the divine comes through Christian—more specifically,
biblical—“language” alone? Such problematic implications strike me as no less
Christian-supercessionist than the assumptions Strawn highlights about the New
Testament obviating the Old.
I believe the lesson here is that just as we must intentionally foster
pluralism within Christianity—even the most Old Testament-fluent Christianity—
we must also link arms with our fellows outside of Christianity. That is to say, while
Christianity carries special risk due to the claim it exercises on the Old Testament,
nevertheless the significance of the looming death of the Hebrew canon is not
merely a Christian issue but a pan-religious one, indeed a human one.9 After all, as
Thomas Merton reminds us, “God speaks, and God is to be heard, not only in Sinai,
not only in my own heart, but in the voice of the stranger” (Merton 2013: §9).10 It
seems to me that we have ready allies outside of Christianity in our effort to restore
the Old Testament to full health, who, while they may not claim it as “authoritative”
or agree that it “functions…in their lives” per se, nevertheless stand behind any
sober, earnest, informed effort to understand the human–divine relationship and
the impact it should have on our lives. Furthermore, stepping outside the realm
of religion entirely, I concur wholeheartedly with Strawn that while the academic/
secular mode of analysis surely has produced opportunities for the advancement of
the Old Testament’s semi-terminal illness, it also serves as a crucial component in its
preservation (pp. 191–92).
Thus, we should not sell short the real possibility of both non-Christian
and nonreligious advocacy for the preservation of the Old Testament as a corpus
with tremendous faith-based and humanistic value. I conclude, therefore, with what
I see as the most fruitful path forward beyond Strawn’s book, a path that advances
the discussion from its posture squarely within the realm of American Christianity
and into the domain of the humanities generally. I must emphasize that I see the
absence of a sustained treatment of this avenue in Strawn’s book not as an omission,
but rather as a matter of the limitations of the volume’s well-defined scope. Thus,
I perceive an opportunity to extend Strawn’s treatment of the Old Testament
in American Christianity outward into a broader contextual overview. To wit, I
believe is important for us to understand the demise of the Old Testament within
a concurrent issue in American culture more generally; namely, the decline of the
humanities, a decline that by now is well documented and requires little or no review.
It practically is a foregone conclusion that the teachers among us have reckoned
regularly with the “Will this be on the test?” mentality, that disgruntled parents (or
students!) are inclined to reach out for a “solution” to some unsatisfactory grade,
despite—or indeed, often, because of—their remission of payment to the institution
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in question, or that the degrees our learning institutions offer are increasingly valued
only insofar as they provide an inconvenient but requisite credential for the jobseeker. The current popular emphasis on STEM instruction at the college level,
which is predicated on the twin notions of “making money” and “helping America
to get ahead,” has led to such unfortunate statements by American leadership as that
of former Florida Governor Rick Scott. “If I’m going to take money from a citizen
to put into education then I’m going to take money to create jobs. So I want that
money to go to degree where people can get jobs in this state. Is it a vital interest of
the state to have more anthropologists? I don’t think so” (Anderson 2011).
To be clear, of course, there is absolutely nothing wrong, and much that
is good, about instruction in STEM disciplines. But, as I suspect we all agree, the
idea that any humanist discipline has minimal or no value is deeply, profoundly
troubling. In the face of declining postgraduate enrollment by international students
in American universities (Quilantan 2018), the ever-increasing (capitalist?) drive to
“quantify everything” (Muller 2018), and the absurdist generalization that defense of
the liberal arts “sounds defensive and self-interested” (Rawlings III 2017), it cannot
come as a surprise to any of us that critical thinking continues to suffer a devastating
assault from all sides. Indeed, it is striking to consider how the privileging of STEM
instruction dovetails with some of the current American religious disposition. One
imagines—and admittedly is puzzled by—those who wish, first, to exercise their
so-called “religious liberty” by refusing to acknowledge the validity of scientific
evidence. Second, that we would stop teaching their children impractical disciplines
that don’t make any money, and teach STEM instead. Third, that those children
would stop growing up to be godless heathens who rely on scientific truths rather
than their faith background!
Especially noteworthy in this regard is the counterpoint to such posturing,
evident in a recent study of algorithmic hiring data conducted by Google. The
research project, which “[tries] to understand the secret of a great future employee,”
is described as follows:
Google originally set its hiring algorithms to sort for
computer science students with top grades from elite science
universities… Project Oxygen shocked everyone by concluding
that, among the eight most important qualities of Google’s top
employees, STEM expertise comes in dead last. The seven top
characteristics of success at Google are all soft skills: being a
good coach; communicating and listening well; possessing
insights into others (including others’ different values and
points of view); having empathy toward and being supportive
of one’s colleagues; being a good critical thinker and problem
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solver; and being able to make connections across complex
ideas (Davidson 2017).11
Based on such evidence, it seems that we may be poised for a resurgence of the
humanities if we can but marshal the necessary tools to move the needle in that
direction. Seen from this perspective, in fact, one is inclined to understand Strawn’s
emphasis on Old Testament fluency as a vector uniquely positioned for impact in
such an effort. Dare we dream of a movement at whose heart stands increased Old
Testament fluency among American Christians, and whose outcome is a broadbased rediscovery of the indispensability of critical thinking?
Admittedly, this vision is idealistic, but I would contend that its idealism
does not in any way mitigate its value or potency. Indeed, despite the dire signs of
morbidity laid out in Strawn’s book, I cannot help but cling to that most Christian
of virtues: hope in a future that more closely resembles the Kingdom, that compels
us to imagine and to “live into” a world that is better than it was before, that reassures
us that our efforts are not futile gestures but vital sowings that promise abundant
fruit. Seen from this perspective, the revitalization of the Old Testament is a singular
element in a much broader process, one that can both benefit from and contribute
to our efforts to restore biblical fluency in American Christianity.
Taking Strawn’s book as a jumping-off point, therefore, I am exceedingly
grateful for this opportunity to help foster the rediscovery of a corpus with which
I myself am in love, while simultaneously engaging in the broader defense of the
humanities, even if only within my narrow area of expertise. I see Strawn’s book
as a throwing-down of this multifaceted gauntlet, which I am eager to take up in
my own work, certainly, but perhaps most productively within the context of this
conversation, as we work together to treat our ailing patient. For this reason, Dr.
Strawn, I am most grateful for your rich, studied, and careful examination, and I
find myself excited to see where the journey leads us as we undertake our important
task.

End Notes
1

2011).

Strawn references three of Seitz’s books (1998: 61–74; 2001: 91–190;

“This prologue to the scriptures can serve as a defensive [galeatum; lit.:
helmeted] introduction to all the books that we convert from Hebrew into Latin,
so that we may be certain that whatever is outside of these is to be set among the
Apocrypha(l works). Therefore Wisdom, which is commonly ascribed to Solomon,
2
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and the book of Jesus son of Sirach and Judith and Tobit and the Shepherd are not
in the canon. The first book of Maccabees is in Hebrew, (whereas) the second is
in Greek, as can be proved from the very style [φράσει]” (Prologue to the Books
of Samuel and Kings [called Prologus Galeatus], emphasis added; Latin text: Hic
prologus Scripturarum, quasi galeatum principium omnibus libris, quos de Hebræo
vertimus in Latinum, convenire potest: ut scire valeamus quidquid extra hos est,
inter ἀπόκρυφα esse ponendum. Igitur Sapientia, quæ vulgo Salomonis inscribitur,
et Jesu filii Syrach liber, et Judith, et Tobias, et Pastor, non sunt in Canone.
Machabæorum primum librum, Hebraicum reperi. Secundus, Græcus est: quod ex
ipsa φράσει probari potest [PL 28, cols. 555–57]). In this Jerome appears to concur
with the contemporary rabbinic rejection of the Septuagint, according to which the
work was a necessity in its time but ultimately yielded inaccuracies in translation
and, perhaps more significantly, the opportunity for the emergence of “hellenistic
heresies” (“hellenistische Irrlehren”; Gärtner 1999, 44).
3
See, e.g., Luther’s preface to the book of Revelation in his translation
of the New Testament (1522), where he says, “I say what I feel. I perceive various
things missing in this book, so that I consider it neither apostolic nor prophetic….
I…cannot believe, all things considered, that it is written by (means of) the Holy
Spirit” (Martin Luther, “Vorrede auf die Offenbarung Johannes”; German text: Ich
sage, was ich fühle. Mir mangelt an diesem Buch verschiedenes, so daß ich’s weder
für apostolisch noch für prophetisch halte…. Ich…in allen Dingen nicht spüren
kann, daß es von dem heiligen Geist verfaßt sei [Wittenberg, 1522]).

See, e.g., the rejection of James and Jude as authoritative documents in
Eusebius (Ecclesiastical History II.xxiii.25).
4

5
Strawn does devote significant space to an examination of the notion of
“canon” and how it relates to that of “authority” (178–84).

See further Strawn’s remarks on “bothness,” as well as a variety of other
manifestations of this point throughout the volume (222–30).
6

7
For example, see Strawn’s unpacking of Joel Osteen’s (apparent) partial
citation of Prov 13:2 or of Joel 4:10 [3:10] (135–37). And these are but single (half-)
verses! The broader context of the Hebrew canon as a whole remains exponentially
more unplumbed by treatments such as Osteen’s.

See especially his Chapter 2, The Old Testament Is Dying, 19–58, and the
Pew Forum data cited therein.
8

9
Strawn, on page 16 n. 43, points out that the “death” of some portion
of the canon is not necessarily unique to Christianity, specifically highlighting the
Jewish encounter with this problem as addressed in Frymer-Kensky’s work (2006:
367–68). Additional brief references to the biblical fluency (or lack thereof) exhibited
in other religious traditions occur throughout his Chapter 2, in his analysis of the
Pew Forum’s survey data (19–28). Note especially his remarks on Mormonism on
(22–24).
10
My thanks to Corinne Harvey Causby and Bill J. Leonard for drawing
my attention to this.
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Davidson’s article appears in a blog by Valerie Strauss, who researches
and writes on public education.
11
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